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Nonlinear Inﬂation Expectations and Endogenous
Fluctuations
Orlando Gomes
Abstract The standard new Keynesian monetary policy problem is presentable as a set of lin-
earized equations, for values of endogenous variables relatively close to their steady-state. As
a result, only three possibilities are admissible in terms of long-term dynamics: the equilibrium
may be a stable node, an unstable node or a saddle point. Fixed point stability (a stable node) is
generally guaranteed for an active monetary policy rule. The benchmark model also considers
extremely simple assumptions about expectations (perfect foresight is frequently assumed). In
this paper, one inquires how a change in the way inﬂation expectations are modelled implies a
change in monetary policy results, when an active Taylor rule is considered. By assuming that
inﬂation expectations are constrained by the evolution of the output gap, we radically modify
the implications of policy intervention: endogenous cycles, of various periodicities, and chaotic
motion will be observable for reasonable parameter values.
Keywords Monetary policy, Taylor rule, inﬂation expectations, endogenous business cycles,
nonlinear dynamics and chaos
JEL classiﬁcation E52, E32, C61 
1. Introduction
The success of monetary policy intervention in controlling inﬂation in most of the
developed world along the past few decades is the result, among other factors, of the
change in the theoretical paradigm followed in macroeconomic science. Since the
famous analysis about the inconsistency problem (Kydland and Prescott 1977; Barro
and Gordon 1983), it is widely accepted that the main goal of monetary policy should
consist in ﬁghting price instability, rather than worrying about real stabilization. This
idea became clearer with the development of the model that has gained the central
position in the explanation of central banks behaviour: the new Keynesian monetary
policy problem (see, among many others, Goodfriend and King 1997; Clarida et al.
1999; Woodford 2003).
The benchmark new Keynesian model has been built over the staggered price-
setting analysis of Calvo (1983), which has allowed recovering the Phillips curve rela-
tion. It is admissible to establish a relation between the contemporaneous values of the
inﬂation rate and of the output gap, through a parameter that reﬂects the degree of price
stickiness; when this relation is augmented by a term that relates the present period’s
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inﬂation with expectations about future inﬂation, we can establish the central piece of
the new monetary policy paradigm, which is the ‘new Keynesian Phillips curve’ (this
denomination was initially proposed by Roberts 1995).
AlongsidewiththeaggregatesupplyrelationthatthePhillipscurvedeﬁnes, another
state constraint is essential to describe the short-run environment in which monetary
authorities are compelled to take decisions; this is an IS equation that characterizes
how the real economic activity responds to changes in the real interest rate.
With the knowledge of the previous two state equations, the central bank has a
problem to solve, which is to maintain price stability and, if possible, to guarantee
somepositivedifferencebetweeneffectiveoutputanditspotentiallevel(ifthisdoesnot
hurt the inﬂation objective). The most immediate solution for this problem would be to
consider an optimal control setup, under which the central bank minimizes the distance
betweentheobservedinﬂationrateandoutputgaprelativelytothecorrespondingtarget
values it deﬁnes. The constraints of this intertemporal problem are the Phillips curve
andtheISequations. Thecontrolvariableisthenominalinterestrate, i.e., themonetary
authority chooses the time path of the interest rate that optimizes its utility function
over time.
If one considers the benchmark version of the optimizing model, a problem arises:
the optimal interest rate path does not correspond to a stable path, and therefore the
intended long term optimal values of inﬂation and output are not accomplished. In
this sense, the stability of the equilibrium becomes a central issue in the way monetary
policy is conducted. If optimal policy is not stable, it is necessary to ﬁnd a less than
optimal result that guarantees stability. This is generally assured by assuming an ad-
hoc interest rate rule instead of following the optimal path.
The inﬂuential work of Taylor (1993) and the huge amount of literature that it has
originated seems to give a satisfactory answer to the stability concern (see, among
many others, McCallum and Nelson 1999; Benhabib et al. 2001; Svensson and Wood-
ford 2003; Benigno and Woodford 2005). It has become widely accepted that an active
Taylor rule (i.e., a monetary policy rule under which in response to an increase in in-
ﬂation the central bank raises the nominal interest rate by more than the increase in
inﬂation), has stabilizing effects. Intuitively, this appears correct: inﬂationary pres-
sures are fought by a monetary policy that triggers an increase in the real interest rate,
which should have the effect of slowing down aggregate demand and, therefore, sustain
the rise in the general price level.
The described monetary policy problem is essentially linear.1 Replacing in the IS
curve the nominal interest rate by a rule in which this rate is dependent on inﬂation
(and also on the output gap), the reduced form of the problem will be a system of two
difference equations where, under perfect foresight, the output gap and the inﬂation
rate depend linearly on previous period values of these two variables (and, also lin-
1 To be precise, the new Keynesian model is founded on the optimizing behaviour of ﬁrms and households,
which gives place to a setting where log-linearization is required in order to be possible to analyze the
relation between economic aggregates. Thus, both the linear dynamic IS and the linear Phillips curve should
be understood as the outcome of a steady-state vicinity evaluation. Over these relations we will apply a
departure from rational expectations that introduces a nonlinearity that holds even in the neighbourhood of
the long-term equilibrium position.
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early, on eventual stochastic shocks on demand and supply). When changing the linear
form of the model the stability result can give place to endogenous cycles, which es-
sentially mean that a public policy oriented to attain price stability may not achieve a
full stability result, but it can produce ﬂuctuations, that will be more or less predictable
depending on their own periodicity.
Concerning the introduction of nonlinearities, authors follow essentially two paths:
(i) When assuming the optimal problem, the original framework considers a qua-
dratic objective function. Various authors, like Cukierman (1999), Ruge-Murcia (2002,
2004), Nobay and Peel (2003), Dolado et al. (2004) and Surico (2004), claim that a
symmetric objective function does not represent properly the true policy problem (au-
thorities do not perceive as equally important positive and negative deviations from
the target values of inﬂation and output gap). Thus, nonlinearities and the possibility
of long term endogenous ﬂuctuations arise in a way that is consistent with empirical
evidence.
(ii) Also consistent with empirical evidence is the fact that the Phillips curve can
hardly be modelled through a linear relation. Clark et al. (1996), Debelle and Laxton
(1997), Schalling (1999), Tambakis (1999) and Akerlof et al. (2001), among others,
present evidence and argue against a linear relation between the inﬂation rate and the
output gap, in the short-run. Gomes et al. (2007) prove that for a speciﬁc functional
form of a non linear Phillips curve, endogenous cycles are found, and this corresponds
mainlyto casesin whichno identiﬁableperiodicity isencountered (i.e., whenassuming
a non linear Phillips curve chaotic motion can be generated for values of parameters
that do not depart signiﬁcantly from empirical data).
In this paper, we consider the non optimal monetary policy model (i.e., we assume
a Taylor rule) and linear Phillips and IS equations that are linear in the relation be-
tween contemporaneous values. The nonlinearity is introduced by departing from the
perfect foresight assumption regarding inﬂation expectations. This is also a subject
debated in the literature, for instance by Jensen (2005), who considers that policy af-
fects expectations about future policy. In Branch and McGough (2009) and Gomes
(2006), inﬂation expectations are modiﬁed by considering heterogeneous agents, who
predict future inﬂation in different ways; under bounded rationality (i.e., under a dis-
crete choice mechanism for the switching between expectation rules) chaotic motion
is also identiﬁed in this case.
In the present setting, we depart from perfect foresight by assuming that agents will
form expectations about inﬂation having in consideration the output gap. The rule is
as follows: when the output gap is equal to its target value, as deﬁned by the central
bank and perceived by private agents, the perfect foresight will hold; if the output gap
rises above that benchmark value, then the expected inﬂation will also rise above the
perfect foresight value; if the output gap falls below the target, agents will predict an
inﬂation value below the perfect foresight value; ﬁnally, for strong recessions (output
gap clearly negative), agents expect inﬂation to rise faster (that is, strong recessions
will be a symptom of an economy where institutions do not work, and therefore the
control of price stability does not function properly).2
2 A similar expectations formation rule is considered in Gomes et al. (2008); the present paper extends such
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This simple assumption over the original monetary policy problem imposes rele-
vant changes on the dynamic behaviour of variables, namely chaos and cycles of var-
ious periodicities are obtained. Therefore, one concludes that monetary policy (under
an active interest rate rule) does not yield necessarily a ﬁxed point result, but cycles of
several periodicities are observable, when considering parameter values that intuitively
are reasonable.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the intu-
ition behind the inﬂation expectations rule; Section 3 presents the analytical structure
of the model; Section 4 characterizes global dynamics; in Section 5, growth issues are
addressed; and, ﬁnally, Section 6 concludes.
2. Inﬂation expectations
The simplest approach to modelling expectations consists in assuming perfect fore-
sight. Under perfect foresight, agents have a complete knowledge about the economy.
They know how every other agent will act and how monetary authorities will conduct
their policy. In turn, authorities should also understand without doubts the decisions
that the private economy take in every moment of time, being as well able to predict
and anticipate the decisions of all economic agents. This implies a world where agents’
choices become the best response to the choices of third parties.
The analysis will be pursued under a deterministic market environment and, thus,
stochastic disturbances will be overlooked. This does not mean that exogenous ﬂuctua-
tions are irrelevant; there will certainly be a large set of external inﬂuences determining
the relation between the inﬂation rate and the output gap. However, by ignoring them
one can concentrate on the nonlinear relations that will emerge in the proposed setting;
without external shocks, all the obtained ﬂuctuations are necessarily endogenous, i.e.,
the result of how the variables in the model are related. Note, as well, that the notion of
perfect foresight is the deterministic equivalent of rational expectations: under ratio-
nal expectations, random changes in the values of variables are admissible, but these
changes correspond to uncorrelated errors, i.e., agents possibly make mistakes but the
mistakes are uncorrelated. In this way, ignoring forecast errors has no decisive impact
on the conclusions one wants to withdraw because in the absence of systematic devi-
ations from the fundamental solution, the considered errors are innocuous in terms of
the obtained long-term outcome.
Nevertheless, one should take into account that the perfect foresight/rational ex-
pectations approach to expectations formation is, in most cases, excessively narrow,
implying full information and full efﬁciency in the use of information - it must be im-
plicitly assumed that the average economic agent has the ability to instantly acquire
knowledge, at every time moment, about the ’true’ model of the economy, a capabil-
ity that the economic science avoids to attribute even to professional economists, who
have to estimate parameters, over time, in order to effectively understand the relations
analysis, exploring new dynamic results and developing further the implications of the obtained nonlinear
results. Furthermore, in this paper we concentrate on inﬂation dynamics; therefore, the output gap is kept at
its perfect foresight level. In the cited paper, bounded rationality is pervasive: it respects not only to inﬂation
but also to the output gap.
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that are established among economic aggregates. This is why macroeconomics has
become increasingly concerned with alternative methods of modelling expectations.
The most widely approached alternative to rational expectations relates to the con-
sideration of learning mechanisms (see, e.g., Evans and Honkapohja 2001). Under
learning, agents will predict future outcomes by collecting and processing informa-
tion over time; as time goes by, the set of available information increases and the
predictability capabilities will also increase. Under this interpretation, rational expec-
tations can be seen as the possible asymptotic state to which the economy converges:
one can conceive a long-run scenario when all the relevant information about some
economic subject has been gathered and processed, such that the individual agent no
longer makes mistakes. This view indicates that perfect foresight should not be inter-
preted as an automatic capability of economic agents; however, it can correspond to
the long-run outcome that will dominate when the learning process is complete and
the agent acquires a perfect ability to forecast the future (once the agent has learned all
that there is to learn, then no more systematic errors will be made).
In the present analysis we ignore any kind of learning mechanism and stick with the
perfect foresight assumption that gives place to the ﬁxed point outcome in the presence
of an active monetary policy rule; nevertheless, over perfect foresight, one takes an
additional assumption that reﬂects how the private economy responds, in terms of the
way it perceives price evolution, to ﬂuctuations in output.
We assume that output gap expectations are solely the outcome of a perfect fore-
sight evaluation: Etxt+1 = xt+1. The output gap variable is deﬁned as the difference
between effective output and potential output (in logs), that is, xt = lnyt  ln ˆ yt. Rela-
tively to the inﬂation expectations, the perfect foresight prediction is adjusted by a term
that translates the way individuals think the difference between effective and potential
output will affect the rise in prices. Thus, we consider Etpt+1 = pt+1x(xt).
Function x(xt) must be such that when the output gap is equal to some predeﬁned
value (that here we consider to be the target value of the central bank for this variable:
x), the value of this function is 1, that is, perfect foresight holds. When xt > x, the
output gap has assumed a value above ‘normal’, and thus agents will suspect that only
a rise in prices will be able to maintain such abnormally high output gap, and hence
they will expect prices to rise above the perfect foresight value. If xt < x, private
agents will perceive a slowdown of the economic activity, and therefore they introduce
a penalty term in their predictions, which means that the expected inﬂation value will
remain below the benchmark value.
Finally, whentheoutputgapbecomesextremelylowrelativelytothecorresponding
target value, this will be understood as a serious problem of economic malfunctioning,
probably associated to an inability of the institutions to fulﬁl their regulatory role, and
therefore very low levels (in principle, negative) of the output gap will be understood
as eventually producing a faster rise in prices because the monetary authority becomes
unable of controlling the production of money and the interest rates.
Figure 1 presents the shape of function x(xt), when this obeys to the characteristics
described above. Parameter s > 0 is deﬁned in order to present the location of the
point in which the function reaches a minimum and therefore the expected inﬂation










Figure 1. Function x(xt)
is the lowest relatively to the perfect foresight value. Note, as stated, that three areas
are identiﬁable: high inﬂation is expected in periods of expansion or strong recession;
moderate recession implies low expected inﬂation.
The function in Figure 1 can be translated analytically as follows:





one modiﬁcation: we bend the line Etpt+1 = pt+1 in order to illustrate how individuals
and ﬁrms react (in terms of price evolution predictions) to the output gap departures
from a reference value.
In the proposed setting, private agents intend to solve their optimization problems
as if perfect foresight continued to hold; however, the available set of information and
the way they interpret reality makes it hard to avoid systematic mistakes. The accuracy
of predictions is progressively lost as the economy departs from the ’reference’ state,
with this reference corresponding to the optimal equilibrium (which corresponds to the
goal that the central bank has deﬁned for the real efﬁciency of the economy). Hence,
instead of assuming perfect foresight, we can interpret the behaviour of the agents as
being ’near rational’. The notion of near rationality and the possibility of small devia-
tions from rationality implying relevant departures from expected economic outcomes
have been thoroughly discussed in the economic literature, for instance by Akerlof and
Yellen (1985), Haltiwanger and Waldman (1989), Bomﬁm and Diebold (1997) and
Weder (2004).
Next section incorporates the near rationality assumption we have been exploring
into the monetary policy framework.
3. The monetary policy model
In what follows we describe the main features of the conventional new Keynesian
monetary model. The state constraints are, on the demand side, a dynamic IS equation,
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and, as an aggregate supply relation, a new Keynesian Phillips curve. The ﬁrst relates
the output gap to the expected real interest rate,
xt =  j (it  Etpt+1)+Etxt+1+gt; x0 is given: (1)
Parameter j > 0 is the output gap - interest rate elasticity and variable it deﬁnes the
nominal interest rate. Variable gt corresponds to a demand stochastic component and
it is deﬁned through an autoregressive Markov process, gt = mgt 1 + ˆ gt, 0  m  1,
ˆ gt  iid(0;s2
g). Subsequently, we ignore the stochastic component of the equation in
order to highlight the presence of endogenous ﬂuctuations. The only consequence of
neglecting the stochastic process is that we will be able to guarantee that the ﬂuctua-
tions to be observed are purely deterministic; if we leaved this component in the speci-
ﬁcation of the model, we would have two simultaneous sources of cyclical motion: the
one that is generated inside the model by the nonlinear relation among variables and
the one that respects to other events on the economy that are not subject to analysis
in the current study (in practice, this is what variable gt represents: all the factors, on
the demand side, that can inﬂuence the relation between output and inﬂation that are
overlooked by the considered analysis).
On the supply side, the Phillips curve relates contemporaneous inﬂation to the out-
put gap and to the next period inﬂation expectations,
pt = lxt +b Etpt+1+ut; p0 is given: (2)
Parameter l 2 (0;1) deﬁnes the degree of price ﬂexibility/stickiness, that is, it is an
inﬂation-output elasticity. The higher the value of this parameter the lower will be the
degree of price stickiness or rigidity. Parameter b < 1 is an intertemporal discount
factor, and variable ut translates a supply stochastic component, that reﬂects possible
cost push shocks. As in the demand case, an autoregressive process is assumed: ut =
rut 1+ ˆ ut, 0  r  1, ˆ ut  iid(0;s2
u); also as in the demand case, this term is ignored
under the discussion of endogenous ﬂuctuations.
To complete the model, one takes a conventional Taylor rule, which is given by the
following expression (a similar Taylor rule can be found in Clarida et al. 1999),
ii = i+gp (Etpt+1 p)+gxxt; (3)
where i deﬁnes the equilibrium nominal interest rate, p is the inﬂation target that the
central bank sets (low, but positive in order to guarantee relative price variations with-
out the need of nominal decreasing of prices and wages), and gp and gx are the policy
parameters that reﬂect how the central bank reacts in terms of interest rate changes,
when economic conditions provoke variations in the values of inﬂation and effective
output.
As stated in the introduction, an active interest rate rule is, normally, stabilizing,
meaning that stability is attained when there is an interest rate response to inﬂation
changesthatarestrongerthanaone-to-onechange; thisimpliesimposingtheconstraint
gp > 1.
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Replacing the Taylor rule (3) in the IS expression (1), and assuming perfect fore-
sight for the output gap, we get the following relation between output gap and inﬂation
rate, regardless from the expectations about inﬂation,
xt+1 = j (i gpp)+[1+jgx j(gp  1)l=b]xt +[j(gp  1)=b]pt: (4)
The Phillips curve can be rewritten, having in consideration the way we have deﬁned
inﬂation expectations in the previous section,
pt+1 = (1=b)[pt=x(xt)] (l=b)[xt=x(xt)]: (5)
The system one wants to analyze is the difference equations system (4)–(5). This
is the conventional problem for s = 0, and it departs from this case as we increase the
value of the parameter (the higher the value of s, the more the inﬂation expectations
rule ‘bends’ relatively to the perfect foresight case). Except in the known particular
case s = 0, the analysis of the steady state and of local dynamics becomes difﬁcult.
Solving for the steady state one would obtain multiple equilibria (a third order polyno-
mial would be obtained and thus three equilibrium points would arise); nevertheless,
the combinations of parameters that deﬁne the steady state points are cumbersome and
it becomes difﬁcult to extract some meaningful information from them. Without the
steady state values, local dynamic analysis is not feasible as well. The next section
concentrates on a global analysis of the underlying dynamics, which is essentially a
numerical and graphical analysis.
4. Global dynamics
System (4)–(5) involves a linear equation and a nonlinear equation. As we will un-
derstand below, the presence of this nonlinear relation opens the possibility for ﬁnding
strange dynamics characterizing the long-term behaviour of endogenous variables.
Otherwise stated, the following parameter values are considered: b = 0:96; gx =
0:5; gp = 2:2; s = 25; j = 0:01; l = 0:75; p = 0:02; x = 0:03; i = 0:01. Note that
for reasonable initial values of variables inﬂation and output gap, we ﬁnd no limit for
the basin of attraction, and therefore any economically meaningful initial values can
be considered for the matter at hand.
We begin by presenting some bifurcation diagrams.3 Figures 2 and 3 display the
long term possible outcomes of the output gap and the inﬂation rate for different values
of the parameter that deﬁnes the nature of the monetary policy gp < 1 respects to a
passivemonetarypolicyandgp >1toanactivepolicy. Themoststrikingandimportant
evidence in these ﬁgures is that instability prevails for a passive interest rate rule, that
is, when the central bank responds to the rise of inﬂation with a less than one-to-one
variation in the nominal interest rate. Instability is characterized in this case by a
divergence of the output gap to inﬁnity and of the inﬂation rate to zero.
3 The various ﬁgures presented in this section are drawn using IDMC software (Interactive Dynamical
Model Calculator). This is a free software program available at www.dss.uniud.it/nonlinear, and copyright
of Marji Lines and Alfredo Medio.
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Figure 2. Bifurcation diagram gp, xt
Figure 3. Bifurcation diagram gp, pt
When the policy parameter assumes a value higher than 1, we observe that instabil-
ity continues to prevail as long as gpi is kept below 1.725; after this value, the modiﬁed
nonlinear expectations model implies the presence of cycles of multiple orders until
an extremely large value of the parameter is considered. Thus, a strongly aggressive
monetary policy (but not exaggeratedly strong) is the only escape, in the considered
framework, relatively to pure instability. As long as the policy parameter gpi remains
inside the interval (1.725; 12.75), given the other assumed parameter values, we will
observe the presence of bounded instability, i.e., the output gap and the inﬂation rate
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will ﬂuctuate, but inside a given set of boundaries. These ﬂuctuations are, for some
values of the parameter, completely irregular (the system is characterized by the pres-
ence of a-periodic and chaotic motion), while for some values of the policy parameter
in the mentioned interval, periodic cycles, of many possible periodicities are displayed.
Basically, we note that some regions in Figures 2 and 3 deﬁne cases in which low
periodicity cycles exist, while in other areas of the graphics it is evident the presence of
chaos: the variable can assume practically any value on a given interval. The existence
of chaos can be conﬁrmed under one of the most striking features of chaotic systems:
the presence of sensitive dependence on initial conditions (SDIC); SDIC indicates that
if a same deterministic system is initiated in two different states, even if very close
to each other, then the corresponding trajectories will follow completely uncorrelated
paths. This occurs for many of the referred potential values of the policy parameter;
the time series that we will present below reﬂect this outcome.
We will highlight further the presence of endogenous ﬂuctuations in the ﬁgures that
follow; nevertheless just by looking to the bifurcation diagrams (that are drawn for the
1,000 observations after the ﬁrst 1,000 transient ones) it is evident that a-periodicity is
present.
One can explore as well the presence of cycles of different orders in the space of
parameters. With Figures 4 to 6, we are able to observe that all sorts of periodicities
are obtainable for different values of parameters. Regions in white contain the possi-
bility of chaotic motion (more speciﬁcally, they correspond to areas where no cycle of
periodicity lower than 20 is observable). These ﬁgures reveal that the dynamic sys-
tem is deeply sensitive to small changes in most of the parameter values. The referred
graphics relate the policy parameter gp to three other relevant parameters: the degree
in which expectations depart from perfect foresight, s , the parameter that measures
the degree of price stickiness, l , and the second policy parameter, gx. In each case,
Figure 4. Cycles in the space of parameters (gp, s)
AUCO Czech Economic Review, vol. 4, no. 3 272O. Gomes
Figure 5. Cycles in the space of parameters (gp, l)
Figure 6. Cycles in the space of parameters (gp, gx)
cycles of multiple periodicities are depicted.
In Figure 4, we conﬁrm that only for gp >1:725, instability can be ruled out; this is
true for any value of s. For very large values of this parameter, a ﬁxed-point outcome
is attainable; however, the most frequent result consists in observing cycles of very
large periodicity or complete a-periodicity. Figures 5 and 6 indicate that the other two
parameters selected for the analysis ( l and gx) are not decisive in terms of dynamic
behaviour; cycles will be observed regardless of the values assumed by any of these
two constants. Nevertheless, Figure 5 points to the fact that stickier prices (lower l)
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increase the range of values of gp that allow for ﬂuctuations.
We now take the set of parameter values deﬁned in the beginning of this section
to display a few attractors, i.e., the long term relation between our two endogenous
variables. Figure 7 considers precisely the initial set of values. To understand how
the dynamics can be modiﬁed, we vary some of the parameter values to present the
graphics in Figures 8 and 9. All the attractors are drawn with 100,000 iterations after
excluding the ﬁrst 1,000 transients.
In Figure 8, we signiﬁcantly change the value of parameter gp in order to place the
Figure 7. Attractor (xt;pt)
Figure 8. Attractor (xt;pt), gp = 11
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Figure 9. Attractor (xt;pt), s = 5
system at a point in which it is clear the evidence of chaos; while in Figure 7 there is
quasi-periodicity (i.e., SDIC is observable, but some regularity is found on the long-
term relation between the output gap and the inﬂation rate), in the second case, we are
in the presence of a strange attractor; the relation between the two variables does not
obey to any kind of regular behaviour. In Figure 9, we return to the original value of
the Taylor rule’s policy parameter and we considerably decrease the value of s; there
are no qualitative changes, in the sense that the attractor continues to correspond to a
quasi-periodic relation between the two endogenous variables.
Finally, a pair of long-term time series is presented, in order to illustrate that the en-
dogenous cycles involve some degree of persistence. The values of parameters used to
Figure 10. Time series xt
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Figure 11. Time series pt
draw these series are the ones in the benchmark case. Note that both variables assume
positive and negative values, that is, periods of inﬂation and deﬂation are observed,
as well as periods when the effective output is above and below the potential level
(Figures 10 and 11).
In what concerns the output gap time series, notice that falls in the output gap occur
at a relatively constant pace, but recoveries follow a different pattern: they begin at a
slow rate, but then they accelerate when the output gap becomes positive. In both cases
(decreasing and increasing output gap phases), the time length for getting from the
highest/lowest output gap to the other extreme is around 11 to 12 periods. Regarding
inﬂation, we observe that both inﬂationary and deﬂationary processes begin slowly but
tend to accelerate to a given peak; once this peak is reached, the inﬂation/deﬂation
situation is rapidly inverted. Note, as well, that episodes of inﬂation are more intense
than the ones concerning deﬂation (in the ﬁrst case, the inﬂation rate will reach higher
values, in absolute value).
5. Growth implications
Monetary policy analysis is undertaken through two state equations that deﬁne short-
run economic conditions. These can be integrated with a long term growth analysis.
Growth models are generally developed under a competitive framework and they are
specially designed to analyze the trend of growth, i.e., they are built in order to charac-
terize potential output motion. Consider a capital accumulation equation
kt+1 = Aka
t  ct +(1 d)kt; k0 is given: (6)
In this equation, kt and ct represent, respectively, per capita physical capital and con-
sumption. Parameter A > 0 is a technological index, a 2 (0;1) respects to the output-
physical capital elasticity and d deﬁnes a positive depreciation rate. From growth lit-
erature it is well known that, given a representative agent that maximizes an intertem-
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poral ﬂow of consumption utility functions, the growth problem is reduced to a two
equations system describing the motion in time of the consumption and of the capital
variable. Then, the long term behaviour of output can be withdrawn from the produc-
tion function, once we know how the rule of capital accumulation and the optimization
behaviour of the representative consumer imply a given path for the capital stock.
Therefore, we can use the growth problem to get to the potential level of output,
ˆ yt = Aka
t . In the real world, we are not concerned with how much it is possible to
produce, but how much it is effectively produced. Given the proposed notion of output





If the competitive growth model is stable, and neoclassical features deﬁne it (i.e.,
output does not grow in the steady state due to endogenous forces) this means that
in the long run we ﬁnd a ﬁxed point stable result for the potential output, and thus
ˆ yt+1 = ˆ yt; the growth rate of effective output becomes, then,
yt+1
yt  1 = ext+1
ext  1, that
is, the growth rate of effective output depends solely on the growth rate of the output
gap. If, instead of neoclassical growth, we take the assumption that the growth model
is endogenous (a positive constant growth rate deﬁnes the steady state), then potential
output grows at a given rate g, meaning that ˆ yt+1 = (1+g)ˆ yt. Also in the case of






The previous reasoning intends to conciliate growth analysis, that under market
clearing conditions clearly aims at explaining growth tendencies, with the short run
analysis provided by the monetary policy problem: because nominal and real eco-
nomic conditions are jointly determined in the short term, and since expectations are
not necessarily the simple result of a perfect foresight evaluation, then ﬂuctuations can
be explained in this policy framework and later added to the growth setup. In this way,
we strongly emphasize the idea that business cycles are a short run phenomenon that
inﬂuences the shape of effective growth in time.
To ﬁnish, we present a simple graphical example, taking the benchmark numerical
Figure 12. Time series of the growth rate of the effective output (g = 0:03)
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values of the previous section. For those values, one has concluded that endogenous
irregular cycles were present. Now, consider that the potential growth rate (derived
from a growth/capital accumulation setup) is, e.g., 3% (g = 0:03). Using the deﬁni-
tion of effective output derived above, and taking the time series of the output gap
in Figure 10, we display in Figure 12 the long term time series of the growth rate of
the effective output variable: the growth rate gravitates around the potential value, but
since the output gap is not constant, then the evolution of the effective output is subject
to endogenous ﬂuctuations.
6. Conclusions
The new Keynesian monetary policy model has two fundamental features: it estab-
lishes aggregate demand and aggregate supply relations that are dynamic and subject
to the inﬂuence of expectations about next period values for real and nominal variables
(these relations are derived from well structured micro foundations); and it introduces
the relevant role of authorities in choosing the path of the nominal interest rate that
best serves the purpose of guaranteeing price stability. It is important to keep in mind
that price stability is not necessarily guaranteed by solving an intertemporal optimal
control problem, because this can guarantee a steady state that is close to the target
deﬁned by the central bank, but that can eventually never be reached given the stability
properties of the underlying difference equations system.
Therefore, the model under consideration constitutes not only a good description
of private economic behaviour in the short run, but it is also a relevant tool for policy
analysis and intervention. The model can be presented in multiple forms, and slightly
modiﬁed in many ways. Recent literature has proved that slight changes in the bench-
mark presentation can lead to signiﬁcant changes in the underlying dynamics, what
modiﬁes as well the policy implications one is able to withdraw. In the present paper
we have tried to include an additional change relatively to the original model—the idea
was essentially to assume that agents do not forecast inﬂation in a perfect way; even
if they possess all the necessary information to decide, they will adjust expectations
about inﬂation to the moment of the business cycle we are in: periods of expansion are
understood as periods where inﬂation will rise faster, while moderate periods of reces-
sion imply a feeling that inﬂation will fall. Thus, we can attach to private economy
agents the notion of near rational decisions.
This change in the model’s structure introduces signiﬁcant changes into the dyna-
mics. The model gains a nonlinear character, and as a result we ﬁnd cycles and chaos
for different values of parameters, that replace the unique ﬁxed point result that the
original model is able to reproduce. The implications are many: ﬁrst, monetary po-
licy, that is, the choice of a nominal interest rate rule, no longer gives an absolutely
predictable long-term outcome; second, price stability will depend on the degree on
which private agents are inﬂuenced by output gap changes when formulating expecta-
tions; third, it is the short-run relation between nominal and real variables that induces
cycles and not the process of capital accumulation, from which one can only withdraw
a constant trend of growth.
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